THE LONDON RESORT

The London Resort Development Consent Order

BC080001

Security Planning Report

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Executive Summary

The London Resort has adopted a security minded approach to all aspects relating to the design, construction, as well as the subsequent operations. All aspects of security have been given the highest consideration by experienced and qualified security consultants who have informed the design from the earliest stages, which will result in effective strategies delivering appropriate and proportionate mitigation measures.

1.   Consultation with the relevant statutory bodies has been and continues to be a key component. Kent Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors and Designing Out Crime Officers have been involved in the development of a robust strategic approach, in accordance with current best practice and design, to minimise threats and promote the agreed objectives:
2.   Protection of all life;
3.   Protection of assets;
4.   Prevention of all crime events and to minimise their impact if realised;
5.   Reduction of business interruptions;
6.   Preservation of essential services; and
7.   Continuity of the primary business operations.

Security-related vulnerabilities have been considered across a range of activities and processes and that, where applicable, physical, personnel, cyber and cross-cutting security measures are properly embedded.

The London Resort Security Strategy will embody a number of key security principles including the implementation of layered security creating protection in depth, crime prevention through environmental design, formal and informal territorial reinforcement and management of spaces, and a robust security partnership with key stakeholders.

Implementation of the security measures will work together to deter hostile activity, detect attempted hostile activity, delay hostile actors, enable an appropriate and effective response, and ultimate deny hostile actors' opportunity to achieve their goals. Alongside these security measures, consideration has also been given to major incident and crisis management.

A range of security features and spatial requirements have been incorporated into the security strategy to mitigate against the identified threats and perceived vulnerabilities, however for security reasons granular details of these measures are not provided for public consumption.

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Glossary

Term	Definition
BH	Buro Happold
BTP	British Transport Police
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CTSA	Counter Terrorism Security Advisor
DCO	Development Consent Order
DOCO	Designing Out Crime Officer
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulations 2018
KCC	Kent County Council
KRF	Kent Resilience Forum
LPA	Local Planning Authority
LRCH	London Resort Company Holdings Ltd
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
VSS	Video Surveillance Systems

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Chapter One ◆ Introduction

This security planning report has been prepared by Buro Happold on behalf of London Resort Company Holdings Limited (LRCH or the Applicant) to inform the concept design for the Proposed Development of a significant visitor attraction and leisure resort, to be known as the London Resort.

This report is based on a thorough understanding of both the reviewed and agreed threats and resultant risks (together with their mitigations) by LRCH and Kent Police (Counter Terrorist Team and Designing Out Crime Team).

A number of technical, physical and operational features, along with spatial requirements, have been incorporated into the London Resort security strategy. However, for security reasons, these are not provided for public consumption. Further and ongoing design development is planned along with consultation with the key security stakeholders

1.1   Guidance and Objectives

This report seeks to demonstrate that the Proposed Development has a security strategy that seeks to comply with:

- National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF);
- Kent Police and Essex Police, Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA), and Designing Out Crime Officer (DOCO) recommendations;
- Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) guidance and recommendations; and
- British Transport Police guidance and recommendations (regarding the close proximity to rail infrastructure and assets).

There are no National Policy Statements (NPS) for business and commercial Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. However, Section 105 of the Planning Act 2008 sets out what the Secretary of State must have regard to in making his or her decision where a relevant NPS is not designated. This includes any matter that *'the Secretary of State thinks is important and relevant to the Secretary of State's decision.'* The NPPF is likely to be a key material consideration in decision-making and therefore paragraph 95a (*Chapter 8 – Promoting Healthy and Safe Communities*) is relevant given that it details:

> *'planning decisions should anticipate and address possible malicious threats especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate…the layout and design of the developments should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps are taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security'.*

The National Policy Statement for Ports (January 2012) has been reviewed as it is likely to be a material consideration in decision making with regards to the London Resort river transport infrastructure and therefore section 4.17 *Security Considerations (Chapter 4 – Assessment Principles)* is relevant given that it details:

> *'4.17.3 Government policy is to ensure that, where possible, proportionate protective security measures are designed into new infrastructure projects at an early stage in the project development'.*

This same statement has also been included within the National Policy Statement for National Networks (December 2014) which, in *Chapter 4 – Assessment Principles, Section 4.7 – Security Considerations,* goes on to add:

> *'4.75 …Where applications for development consent for infrastructure covered by this NPS relate to potentially 'critical' infrastructure, there may be national security considerations.*
>
> *4.76 Where national security implications have been identified, the applicant should consult with the relevant security experts from the CPNI and the Department for Transport, to ensure that physical, procedural and personnel security measures have been adequately considered in the design process and that adequate consideration has been given to the management of security risks.'*

The principal objective of this report is therefore to demonstrate that all aspects of security have been given the highest consideration and that qualified security consultants, along with consultation with the appropriate security stakeholders, have informed the design from the earliest stages resulting in appropriate, agreed and effective mitigation measures and strategies. The security strategy includes a combination of physical, technological and operational measures.

1.2   Security Objectives

The security objectives are:
*   Protection of Life;
*   Protection of Assets;
*   Prevention of all crime events and to minimise their impact if realised;
*   Reduction of business interruptions;
*   Preservation of essential services; and
*   Continuity of the primary business operations.

Chapter Two ◆ Site and Project Description

The London Resort will be a world-class, sustainable, next generation entertainment resort, founded on sustainability and low carbon principles. A unique and immersive destination, the London Resort with be globally competitive, and mark a step-change in leisure and entertainment provision in the United Kingdom with a global presence. The first themed park 'gate' will open in 2024 (Gate One) and the second (Gate Two) in 2029.

2.1 Site Location

The Project Site lies approximately 30 km east-south-east of central London on the south and north banks of the River Thames, in the ceremonial counties of Kent and Essex. For clarity, the section of the Project Site to the south of the River Thames is referred to as the 'Kent Project Site' and that to the north of the river is identified as the 'Essex Project Site'. The term 'Project Site' refers to both the Kent and Essex Project Sites collectively. The 'Order Limits' within which the proposed DCO would apply are shown on the Location Plan (Figures 2-1 and 2-2).

The Kent Project Site occupies much of the Swanscombe Peninsula, formed by a meander in the River Thames, and includes a corridor for transport connections extending generally southwards to the A2(T). It also includes a section of the A2(T) corridor approximately 3.5 km in length between the existing Bean junction to the west (A2(T) / B255) and Pepper Hill (A2(T) / B262) to the east. The Kent Project Site occupies 387.53ha of land in a complex shape.

The Kent Project Site includes land falling within the jurisdiction of Dartford Borough Council (DBC) to the west and Gravesham Borough Council (GBC) to the east. The majority of the Kent Project Site also falls within the Ebbsfleet Garden City, established in April 2015, for which Ebbsfleet Development Corporation (EDC) is the Local Planning Authority.

The High Speed 1 (HS1) line crosses the Kent Project Site along an approximate north-west to south-east axis. The urban areas of Stone, Greenhithe, Ingress Park and Swanscombe lie to the west and south. These are largely residential in character, with commercial uses concentrated on Stone's river frontage. Beyond Greenhithe to the south-west of the Kent Project Site lies Bluewater shopping centre, a significant regional retail destination. To the east of the Kent Project Site lies Northfleet, a neighbourhood of mixed residential and commercial uses.

Across the southern and south-eastern parts of the Swanscombe Peninsula is an extensive industrial area concentrated around Manor Way, Galley Hill and London Road. To the south of the A2(T) the land is more open and rural in character, with small settlements amid farmland and woodland blocks. Most of this area lies in the Metropolitan Green Belt.

The Essex Project Site includes areas of land east of the A1089 Ferry Road and the Tilbury Ferry Terminal, incorporating the London International Cruise Terminal and non-contiguous the Asda

roundabout at the junction of the A1089 St Andrews Road / Dock Road, Windrush Road and Thurrock Park Way. The Essex Project Site is 25.54 hectares in area.

The Essex Project Site falls within the jurisdiction of Thurrock Council, a unitary authority. The Essex Project Site lies immediately to the east of the existing port of Tilbury and to the west of Tilbury2, a new port currently under construction. At the south-east corner of the Port lies the Tilbury Ferry Terminal incorporating the London International Cruise Terminal (a grade II* listed building featuring a floating landing stage and series of bridge structures). The Asda roundabout is located to the north of the port of Tilbury and incorporates highway land.

Figure 2-1: The London Resort Project Site Location

2.2   Project Description

The Resort will be a nationally significant visitor attraction and leisure resort, built largely on brownfield land at Swanscombe Peninsula in Kent on the south bank of the River Thames and with supporting transport and visitor reception facilities on the northern side of the river in Essex.

A detailed description of the Proposed Development is provided in chapter three of the Project ES. The focus of the Resort will be a 'Leisure Core' containing a range of events spaces, themed rides and attractions, entertainment venues, theatres and cinemas, developed in landscaped settings in two phases known as Gate One and Gate Two ('the Gates'). Outside the Gates will be a range of ancillary retail, dining and entertainment facilities in an area known as the Market.

The Resort will also include hotels, a water park connected to one of the hotels, a conference and convention centre known as a 'conferention centre', a Coliseum (capable of hosting e-Sports events), creative spaces, a transport interchange including car parking, 'back of house' service buildings, an energy centre, a wastewater treatment works and utilities required to operate the Resort. Related housing is also proposed to accommodate some of the Resort's employees.

Substantial improvements are proposed to transport infrastructure. This will include a new direct road connection from the A2(T) and a dedicated transport link between Ebbsfleet International Station, the Resort and a passenger ferry terminal beyond. The ferry terminal would serve visitors arriving by ferry on the River Thames from central London and Tilbury. A coach station is also proposed. On the northern side of the Thames to the east of the Port of Tilbury, additional coach and car parking and a passenger ferry terminal are proposed to serve the Resort.

The Proposed Development would involve an extensive restoration of land used in the past for mineral extraction, waste disposal and industrial activities including cement and paper production, with a comprehensive landscape strategy proposed incorporating the retention and enhancement of wildlife habitats.

Figure 2-2: The London Resort Illustrative Masterplan

Chapter Three ◆ Pre-Application Consultation

3.1 Key Stakeholders

The Kent Resilience Forum (KRF) has been consulted throughout the design process to date to ascertain the expectations and requirements of the various emergency services and key stakeholders, as well as building the foundations for strong collaboration moving forwards. The KRF meetings had representatives from all key emergency services present (Kent Police, Kent Fire and Rescue, South East Coast Ambulance Service) as well as local and district authority representatives, rail stakeholders, and representatives from Dover Port Authority and the Channel Tunnel.

Coordination has also taken place with:
- Kent Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs);
- Kent Police Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs);
- Essex Police;
- Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI); and
- British Transport Police (BTP) Counter Terrorism Security Advisors.

Through consultation with these key stakeholders, a series of proportionate recommendations have been made. These will be included within the overall security design. For security reasons, they are not provided in detail for public consumption. Consultation will continue with both Kent Police and Essex Police. If these measures change in the detailed design stage, LRCH will continue to consult with the key stakeholders

The involvement of the CTSAs and DOCOs, as well as the CPNI, has been a key strand in the development of the security strategy to ensure that terrorist and crime prevention concerns are discussed and addressed. As the design progresses in accordance with approved standards, assurance will be maintained through the identification of security products, contractors and project management of installation. Collaboration with the key emergency services stakeholders, including representatives from the Kent Resilience Forum, will continue with a series of workshops and table-top exercises ongoing throughout the upcoming design stages to ensure that all security and emergency considerations are appropriately addressed.

3.2 Security Threat and Risk Assessment

Liaison with the CTSAs and DOCOs was established to assist in the compilation of the Security Threat and Risk Assessment (confidential), which forms the foundation of the developing security strategy.

Consultation with the Kent and Essex Police will be undertaken before detailed design is to be secured in the DCO. Further to this, consultation will also take place with other key stakeholders. The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) defines Crowded Places

as a location of environment to which members of the public have access that may be considered potentially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of its crowd density.
Whilst the NPPF does not make specific recommendations on the above, the CPNI states that the London Resort may be subjected to a wide range of malicious threats and that such locations attract high densities of users and as such may be targeted by terrorists.

Crime, and the prevention of such, is one the principal considerations in the development of the security strategy for the London Resort. Visitor attractions and transport hubs are attractors of volume crime. Generally, this means high volumes of low-level 'petty' crime, such as pick-pocketing, bag theft, and anti-social behaviour. Hotels can experience higher levels of theft and burglary, particularly within communal areas, and anti-social behaviour is prevalent in areas with night-time economies such as theatres, bars and restaurants.

The threats present to both the London Resort and the Essex Project site together with the impact on the local communities during the Construction Phases have also been taken into consideration. Appropriate mitigation will be implemented as shaped by the key stakeholders. These security measures are set out in section4 but not described in detail for security reasons. Throughout the detailed design stage of the Proposed Development, the key stakeholders will continue to be consulted.

London Resort will therefore benefit from a consistent, clear appropriate to threat and risk through an agreed threat and risk assessment. A tailored approach has been adopted by firstly creating a bespoke framework for LRCH considering threats from the operating environments as well as specific threats associated with the London Resort design, construction and end use. A clear description of this threat is an essential prerequisite for assured and effective physical protection. A physical protection system design shall be scalable to meet emerging threats.

Chapter Four ◆ Security Design Principles

The security aim from the outset is to deliver elegant, cost-effective and flexible solutions which meet the needs of a wide range of users and complement the aspirations of the LRCH and the Kent Police. The security design process has been developed to ensure that potential security-related vulnerabilities are considered across a range of activities and processes and that, where applicable, physical, personnel, cyber and cross-cutting security measures are properly embedded.

Robust decisions will be made regarding when and where protective security measures are required. The decision-making process also needs to consider the type and extent of measures that are appropriate as well as proportionate to the risks, factoring in the decreasing separation between the physical and technological aspects within the built environments of the buildings, infrastructure and services.

The following design elements are among those being considered and implemented within the overall security strategy for the London Resort:

- Pedestrian and vehicle access control / screening, search and validation where appropriate;
- Hostile vehicle mitigation measures;
- Surveillance;
- Intruder detection;
- Lighting;
- Security control and crisis management facilities;
- Perimeter security;
- Construction site security; and
- Identification of key threats and vulnerabilities identified in the Security Threat and Risk Assessment.

4.1 Layered Security – Protection in Depth

Physical security involves a number of distinct measures which form part of a 'protection in depth' approach to security, and which must take account of the balance between prevention, protection and response. Physical security measures or products, such as locks and doors, are categorised according to the level of protection offered.

Successful security is most effective when implemented in a series of concentric layers. These layers feature access control and vehicle management on the Project Site as a whole, design of approach routes, further vehicle management and stand-off distances against the building facades and finally, control of stand-off distances and security design to the immediate vicinity of individual assets.

The layered approach to physical security starts with the protection of individual assets and people, and then proceeds progressively outwards to include the building facades, external spaces, DCO Order Limits, and the immediate surroundings. Approach routes, to both the London Resort and the Essex Project site have been considered, as well as the utilities and services beyond the perimeter. To ensure appropriate physical security controls are relevant to both sites the issues, the following must be considered:

- Impact of loss of the site or asset;
- Identification of threat and level of associated risk;
- Vulnerability; and
- Value of the assets.

Protection in depth should be applied to the London Resort and its assets, to mitigate security risk, based on the following principles:

- Deterrence – measures to deter those who may be looking to commit crimes or cause a security incident;
- Detection – measures that provide time and space for the detection of breaches in security and unauthorised access;
- Delay – measures that impose a delay on those committing crimes or security breaches, increasing the risk of detection and being caught by those responding to the incident;
- Response – controls which provide time for an effective response to incidents or alarms raised; and
- Recovery – measures which support incident recovery.

4.2 Secured by Design and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Consultation with the Kent Police has led to agreement that the Secured by Design (SBD) principles and standards relevant to the London Resort and Essex Project site will be implemented within the design. SBD follows CPTED principles with the addition of specific guidance and British Standards relating to physical and technical security measures.

The aim of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is to reduce the opportunities for crime by the effective design and use of the build environment. CPTED draws heavily on behavioural psychology by examining the relationships between people and their environment.

The behaviour of an offender can be influenced by the design of the environment and this will impact on their rational choice thought process, such as:

Will I be seen?
If I am seen, will anyone notice me?
If I am noticed, will anyone do anything about it?

An offender will always assess the environment before committing a crime (this is called Rational Choice, commonly understood as risk versus reward). The security philosophy is

centred on the principles of CPTED, the key strategies of which are set out in the subsequent sections.

4.3 Access Control

Strategies of access control encourage, restrict and channel activities and aim to deny access to a potential crime target. Access control at the London Resort will involve both informal, formal, and mechanical strategies.

- Informal strategies incorporate natural features that change the spatial definition of locations (e.g. changes in land elevation).
- Formal access control will be more purposeful and organised and, like formal surveillance, is carried out by third parties who in their normal functions can deny people access to specific areas (e.g. security personnel, receptionist, ticket collectors).
- Mechanical access control involves the use of gates and barriers (including hostile vehicle mitigation such as bollards), and electronic access control systems on doors.

4.4 Surveillance

The London Resort will utilise both formal and informal surveillance, with the key objective to increase the perceived risks associated with offending by increasing the likelihood that behaviour within a particular area will be observed. Surveillance aims to increase the potential for intervention, apprehension and prosecution. Informal systems incorporate natural surveillance which will be applied to both external and internal areas and involves ensuring there are clear visible sightlines so individuals can observe and be observed as they go about their routine activities. Formal systems (video surveillance systems) will increase guardianship and provide situational crime prevention.

Spaces within the Proposed Development will be designed to provide a high degree of natural surveillance achieved by ensuring the landscaping does not obstruct the vision of those occupying the space. This will be supplemented with technological surveillance where appropriate.

Where video surveillance systems (VSS) are utilised, the main purpose will be the real time monitoring of both internal and external spaces for rapid detection and response of any incidents that may occur. As well as being a deterrent, cameras will have the ability to provide evidence that can be used for post incident analysis; the resulting recordings, when exported will be powerful evidence and may be used in legal proceedings against perpetrators.

4.5 Territorial Reinforcement

This is a key 'defensible space' concept and involves generating and confirming a sense of proprietorship and ownership among the approved users of particular spaces and discouraging illegitimate users. Territorial reinforcement requires creating and maintaining spatial hierarchies and ensuring clear, well-recognised boundaries between public and private areas. Through the

use of physical and symbolic barriers, space can be divided into five distinct categories: public (no restrictions), semi-public (minimal restrictions), semi-private (ticketed spaces), private (staff only), and restricted (limited staff).

4.6 Maintenance and Management

The maintenance and the 'image' of an area can have a major impact on whether it will become targeted. Territorial concern, social cohesion and a general sense of security will be reinforced by the strong identity of the London Resort. The selection of materials and finishes of particular physical design elements (from building facades to street furniture and landscaping elements) will impact the types of maintenance regimes required.

The development and implementation of a maintenance regime form an essential component in the prevention of crime.

4.7 Integrated Approach

LRCH is co-ordinating with other disciplines with other disciplines, including (but not limited to) transportation and crowd flow specialists, inclusive design consultations, and flooding specialists, along with extensive coordination with the landscape and architectural teams, to ensure that security is integrated into each strand of the design.

4.8 Security Partnership

A key component of the security strategy is the sharing of information and intelligence within the confines of the General Data Protection Regulations 2018 (GDPR). This is especially relevant to the sharing of information, which comprises of personal data, which in the context of the security partnership covers the sharing of information relating to persons suspected of criminal behaviour.

Security and safety of people cannot be maintained in isolation and in order to be successful it has to cross boundaries. LRCH has formed ongoing and strong partnerships with each of the principal stakeholders including police, other emergency services, local authorities, transport and health), each of which would, in the event of an emergency or as a consequence of crime or disorder, have an impact on the activities within the Project Site.

Chapter Five ◆ Major Incident and Crisis Management

5.1 Security Control and Response

The London Resort has a specially designed Security Control and Crisis Management Centre from which all security operations will be coordinated and controlled; as well as providing collaborative facilities for use by emergency services in the event of a major incident, this is located within the Kent Project Site. There will be a number of strategically located local security spaces throughout the London Resort and Essex Project Sites to allow for rapid response as well as operational resilience.

The following emergency procedures were outlined at a high level at the Kent Resilience Forum Executive Board Meetings on 29th July and 24th August 2020. It was agreed by the responding emergency services, Kent Police, Kent Fire and Rescue and South East Coast Ambulance Service that an effective communications system must be available within the London Resort.

5.2 Security Communications and Messaging

There is a need to provide a communications system throughout the London Resort capable of providing directional messaging to both personnel and members of the public. This will be achieved through a Public Address and General Alarm system (PAGA), alongside digital signage, the use of apps on smart devices, and extensive staff training. The PAGA system shall provide a warning capability and real-time updates to all onsite personnel and visitors during a security or safety related incident. The system will be integrated with the Security Control and Crisis Management Centre and will be capable of provide audible warnings (both voice messages and alarm tones) to either specific zones within individual facilities or across all the sites that form part of the Project Site.

This approach can be used to:
- Save lives by informing personnel and members of the public that an incident is underway and provide them with basic information on what action must be taken;
- Alter people's behaviour by providing current, relevant information such as the location of an incident or directions towards a safe means of egress; and
- Reassure personnel and members of the public.
- This messaging system will be classed as part of the critical life safety functions and as such will have a number of redundancies and backups designed to ensure that functionality is retained throughout emergency scenarios.

5.3 Evacuation

Evacuation in response to a terrorist or security threat is not the same as evacuation due to fire or other incidents and the appropriate response may be different. The policy of simultaneous evacuation where all occupants leave the Resort at the same time may not be the most appropriate response. In a fire response, it may be appropriate to use all available exits; in a terrorism scenario consideration should be given to directing people via alternative 'safe' routes to avoid exiting into a potentially hostile situation.

There are a number of options for emergency response during a security incident, including:

- A full site evacuation – necessary to provide the best opportunity for survivability by moving people to a place of safety outside the Resort. Circumstances requiring a full site evacuation are likely to be few.
- A phased evacuation – used to give priority to those people closest to or most at risk from the threat. It may also be used to prevent overcrowding of evacuation routes or areas outside the Resort.
- Partial or zonal evacuation – evacuation of specific areas within the Resort providing the ability to contain the threat without impacting the wider Resort operations
- A directional evacuation - people are directed to specific exits and routes to avoid an area at risk. This may increase evacuation time but reduce risk and improve survivability.
- An invacuation to safer (protected) areas – the movement of people within the Resort, sometimes to protected spaces, and should be considered when the threat is either outside the Resort (or specific zone) and so prevents a safe egress, or the exact nature of the threat is unknown and people may otherwise pass by or into an area of risk.
- No action is required (a decision is made not to evacuate or invacuate) – a scenario where it is judged safest for people to remain where they are.
- Lockdown – this is where, because of an internal or external threat, the greatest chances of survivability are for the Resort to be locked down and people are not permitted to leave or enter the area, or particular sections therein.

The decision on which response or combination of responses is appropriate in any particular security threat situation should be guided by the best chances of survivability for all those present at the site including visitors, staff, and responders. Coordination with the police and appropriate emergency services will be required in all decision-making processes regarding evacuation.

Evacuation routes will be designed throughout all areas of the London Resort to ensure the continued safety of all people within and will consider the resultant impacts on the local business and residential communities as well as the highways network. Coordination with the emergency services and other responding partners will continue during the operation of London Resort.

Chapter Six ◆ Conclusion

This report sets out the security design principles and intent that have informed the design of the Proposed Development to date. Consultation has been undertaken, and is further ongoing, with the relevant statutory bodies including the Kent Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors and Designing Out Crime Officers to develop a robust strategy to minimise threats in accordance with current best practice and design.

All aspects of security have been given the highest consideration and experienced and qualified security consultants have informed the design from the earliest stages which will result in appropriate, agreed and effective strategies and mitigation measures. An assessment has been completed which has identified the range of threat to which the Resort may be vulnerable together with the level of risk associated to each threat. This will form the basis upon which the security strategy will be further developed.

A number of security features and spatial requirements have been incorporated into the security strategy, however for security reasons these are not provided for public consumption.

The security strategy will include, but is not limited to:
- Pedestrian and vehicle access control / screening, search and validation;
- Hostile vehicle mitigation measures;
- Surveillance;
- Intruder Detection;
- Lighting;
- Security Control facilities; and
- Identification of the key threats and vulnerabilities captured within the Security Threat and Risk Assessment.

The response to threats will, however, continue to evolve and the Proposed Development will be continually assessed from an operational perspective in conjunction with LRCH own experience and management policies.